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What is this thing called ‘heterodox economics’?
1 
 
“To classify is human and all cultures at all times have produced classification systems” 
(Bowker and Star, 1999: 131) 
 
“He has never been a White person…And I do not believe he will ever become one” 




Ayers (1936) appears to be the first to use the term ‘heterodox economics’ (hereafter, 
HE). In Ayers, HE was merely a throwaway term; probably the consequence of him 
searching for a synonym or summary term for an opposing set of ideas. More recently, 
the term HE has taken on stronger meaning and been debated and defined by several 
leading authors (Dequech, 2007; Dow, 2000; Lawson, 1997, 2006, 2009; Lee, 2009; 
Potts, 2000; Backhouse, 2004; see also Colander, 2009; Colander et al, 2004; Davis, 
2009). All offer a vision of HE as a set of ideas but are able to define it quite simply, i.e. 
often in terms of a single criterion.  
Thus, the growing literature on the nature of heterodox economics has generated 
several variants of the term. How do we make sense of these variants; and can they be 
resolved? What do these variants tell us about heterodox economics itself? Should we 
                                                 
1 This paper has benefited from comments from Sheila Dow. The usual disclaimer applies.    2 
think of heterodox economics as a set (as in Dequech, 2007), as a system (drawing on 
Dow’s (2004) treatments of schools of thought), or perhaps as a race of economists, or 
even as a specie, a sub-species or just a hybrid? Races and species might be considered 
‘scientific’ categories. But is it the case that HE can be described similarly? Or is HE 
more ephemeral like the categorisations of music genres, or more political such as the 
Nursing Interventions Classification (Bowker and Star, 1999).  
All of the literature cited may simply amount to interesting academic discussion; 
however, the category of HE has taken on considerable import. It is employed as a means 
to distinguish one group (or set of groups) of economists from another; similarly it is 
used to distinguish sets of ideas; it is a weapon for attacking one group or another; it is a 
tool in debates over economic policy, curriculum design and politics. HE has become a 
recognised term with accompanying implications for those labelled with it, or those 
choosing that label. 
This paper will provide a type of meta-analysis of a sample of commentaries on 
heterodox economics, also drawing on biological literature and other treatments of 
classification. The paper contrasts what might be called a ‘classical’ category with a 
‘modern’ category and then analyses treatments of HE as a category. It is argued that 
though HE appears to be a complex object – and that authors recognise this – HE as a 
category is most often classical even though modern would appear more appropriate. 
That this is the case may reflect choices of levels of abstraction which in turn reflect 
instrumental purposes of influencing the reality of Economics. While arguments for the 
rejection of HE as a category are too strong, current treatments of HE are perhaps not   3 
careful enough in recognising its provisional and fluid nature. The paper considers these 




Most of the attempts to define HE come from either historians of economics (see Wrenn, 
2007), methodologists, or leading authorities in schools of thought which were seen to be 
outside the mainstream. Sherman (1987) and Sawyer (1989) offer implicit visions of HE 
as a synthesised product of extant non-orthodox theories. Arestis (1992) bases a HE 
around elements of a radical Post Keynesianism. Dugger (1989) makes a similar attempt, 
with institutionalism the central plank. Davidson (passim) tries to define HE as a 
particular strand of existing heterodox thought, i.e. a particular reading of Keynes. 
George (2008) defines HE as developments outside the mainstream; but not of the type 
referred to by the authors above.  
Although schools of economic thought are often defined in terms of theory, 
definitions of HE are often methodological (here, meaning to deal with methods and/or 
their ontological and epistemological underpinnings). For Lee (2010a: page) the essential 
difference between HE and the mainstream is of whether they theorise the provisioning 
process as social rather than individual. Lawson (1997) argues that heterodoxy can be 
identified as advocating depth realism and open systems. Dow (2000) similarly argues 
that heterodox views share a belief in open systems (although the concept may mean   4 
different things to different groups
2). For Lawson (2006), HE has many elements, but the 
essential nominal difference between it and the mainstream is that the latter insists on 
mathematical modelling. Underlying that, Lawson (2006, 2009) argues, is a real essence 
of HE which is a particular social ontology, which is structured and open. Colander 
(2009) shares Lawson’s view and defines the mainstream as being an attitude, a 
“willingness to compete within a given set of rules and institutional structures” (2), and 
heterodoxy as a willingness to do think otherwise. Lavoie (1992) defines heterodox 
economics as holding to realism, organicism, procedural rationality, and a focus on 
production (all of these are counterpoised with neoclassical principles). Lavoie (2006a) 
defines heterodoxy additionally in terms of a belief in the need for government 
intervention and regulation. Lavoie (2006b) searches for elements common to heterodox 
theories and identifies several, including the held need to theorise a monetary production 
economy. Lavoie (2006b: 104) further proposes that the transactions-flow matrix 
associated with Godley and Shaikh (2002) and Taylor (2004) might be a unifying 
framework for HE. Potts (2000) defines a heterodox approach as one in which a unified 
field theory is rejected in favour of complex systems. Davis (2009) adopts Lawson’s 
vision of ontology but highlights specific treatments of time (as historical, irreversible), 
the individual as embedded in society, and as agents and structures affecting each other 
as distinctly heterodox. Meador (2009) claims that HE is defined in terms of an episteme 
(a la Foucault) different from mainstream economics; one which is as yet unidentified 
because it is difficult to do so inside the mainstream episteme. Backhouse (2004) holds 
that core beliefs are something which defines HE; Backhouse (2000) refers to core 
                                                 
2 Dow (private post) emphasises that she does not regard open systems as an homogeneous concept, and 
that different schools of thought may hold different ontological positions. This does not appear to be the 
case for Lawson.   5 
assumptions. So, according to this literature, in defining HE, methodological approach, 
including one’s view of the nature of the world, is important.  
Most of the above definitions of heterodox are what Dequech (2007) calls 
‘positive intellectual’: i.e. they make claims about what kinds of ideas heterodox 
economists do hold. However, as hinted at above, most if not all of these treatments also 
regard HE as being distinct and in opposition to mainstream or orthodox economics. 
Indeed, Dequech (2007) surveys many of the above alternative definitions of HE and 
argues that the only thing they have in common is that HE is not mainstream economics: 
this is Dequech’s ‘negative intellectual’ definition of HE. This approach can be traced 
back to Ayers’ (1936) seminal contribution. 
Therefore, a starting point for most definitions of HE is to assume that it is non-
mainstream economics. However, from the previous paragraph, the literature suggests 
that HE is more than merely non-mainstream economics. Again, it seems likely that this 
surplus element is methodological.  
A feature of many treatments of HE is to claim that a central element of HE is that 
its members self-identify as heterodox. Backhouse (2004), Wrenn (2004, 2007), Colander 
et al (2004), Dequech (2007), and Lawson (2009) all take this view. Davis (2009) argues 
that heterodox economists can be identified partly in terms of their orientation, i.e. in 
terms of their desire to change mainstream economics, or to operate outside it. This 
strand of the literature is important for at least two reasons. First, several authors focus on 
heterodoxy as attitudinal, as a state of mind (see Colander, 2009, above), as rejecting sets 
of rules, theories or practices, and actively espousing other sets. Second, when we 
consider sociological definitions of HE, power becomes crucial. The use of labels can   6 
itself be a source of power. If heterodox economists have labelled themselves, this may 
indicate a source of power; whereas is they have been labelled thus by the mainstream, 
that suggests very different power relations.  
Dequech (2007) distinguishes intellectual definitions of HE from sociological 
definitions. Sociological definitions tend to focus on the holding of power. Backhouse 
(2000, 2004) and Dequech (2007) use an explicitly sociological definition. In other work, 
the sociological approach is implicit. Colander’s (2009) and Lavoie’s (2006b) discussion 
of rules suggests sociological analysis, as does Meador’s (2009) invocation of epistemes. 
On the face of it, sociological explanations of HE are also quite convincing. Backhouse 
(2004) argues that they are able to accommodate changes in theory and method whilst 
still maintaining HE as a coherent entity. Indeed, viewed from the perspectives of schools 
of thought traditionally classed as heterodox, the sociological element of HE seems 
obvious. Schools of thought such as Marxism, Post-Keynesianism and Institutionalism all 
emphasise power in the analysis of socio-economic outcomes.  
Further, an appreciation of power is apparent in the actions of self-identified 
heterodox economists. For example, the formation and development of the Association 
for Heterodox Economics (formerly, and also, the Association of Heterodox Economists) 
(AHE) has created an institutional structure and face for a group of economists who wish 
to declare themselves different from the mainstream in some way, and who have some 
common beliefs. The AHE’s role has been explored in depth by Lee (2010b). It is 
apparent that the AHE has developed from merely an arena for airing and sharing 
heterodox ideas into an organisation which acts in advocacy for heterodox economists. 
Moreover, somewhat in its role as part of the International Confederation of Associations   7 
for Pluralism in Economics (ICAPE), the AHE has campaigned for pluralism in 
economics. This has involved organising journal issues (see Denis, 2009) on pluralism, 
encouraging the development of heterodox ecological economics (see Douai, et al, 
forthcoming), arguing against institutional structures which may discriminate against 
specific types of economist and their work (see Freeman, 2009).  
Thus far, a discussion of relevant literature on HE suggests that it can be defined 
in terms of key ideas, which are often methodological rather than theoretical; that to be a 
heterodox economist is to identify with these ideas; that these ideas are often self-
consciously opposed to mainstream ideas, and consequently, that heterodox economists 
set themselves up as opposed to the mainstream; and that HE may also reflect power 
relations within the Economics discipline. It may appear that the task of defining HE is 
complete. However, two problematic conclusions follow from the above: one, that HE is 
a complex object defying simple definition; and two, that there is a raft of literature 
providing simple definitions of HE which would appear to be undermined. Further, 
casual observation suggests that under almost all of the definitions, there appear 
anomalies, exceptions, others: those who do not comfortably fit into either HE or 
mainstream economics. Yet, very many of the treatments in the literature treat HE and 
mainstream economics as strictly distinct.  
 
Classification and ‘Heterodox Economics’ 
 
The eminent zoologist Mayr (1969) claimed that all animals engage in classification, e.g. 
of what to eat and what not to eat, what is predator, what is prey, etc. Bowker and Star   8 
(1999) claim (above) that it is human to classify; and that all human societies have 
produced classification systems
3. In fact, what we call classification often covers the 
related activities of creating systems of categories, naming them, and identifying where 
individuals fit into them. The literature on the nature of HE demonstrates all three 
activities. Commentators above have defined HE based on some criteria(on), they have 
attached a particular label to it and then in some cases gone about claiming that 
economist x is heterodox
4. So, for instance, Dequech (2007) has reached a general 
conclusion about the membership of the set ‘HE’ based on observing the single common 
factor between different characterisations of HE (i.e. as non-mainstream). Dequech’s 
reasoning is an induction, but also draws upon an a priori characterisation of HE (as 
being oppositional).  
Treatments of HE can resemble classifications of creatures into species. One 
might imagine heterodox and mainstream economics as being like lions and tigers, both 
big cats (from the same genus, panthera), or even as different breeds of dog; or one might 
consider their difference as more like that between a llama and a lizard; as very different 
classes of animal. In zoology, there are clear grounds for distinguishing between a llama 
and a lizard; whereas in economics, these grounds are less clear. Indeed, classifications of 
economists seem quite messy, changeable and affected by many factors which at first 
glance would appear distant from zoological procedures. ‘HE’ looks like a very different 
type of category from ‘lion’ or ‘tiger’.  
                                                 
3 Several treatments can be found which illuminate the problems of classification. Goto (1982) discusses 
zoological taxonomy. Bowker and Star (1999) offer discussion of social classifications such as the NIC or 
the ICD. Malik (2008) discusses race specifically. 
4 The literature on critical realism in economics has done similar things, although the emphasis here has 
tended to be on identifying individuals who may or may not be (inspired by) critical realism (see, for 
example, Fleetwood (1995) on Hayek, Pratten (1996) on neo-ricardians).   9 
Two questions from taxonomy are relevant here: what is the method of 
constructing the category – particularly the way data are analysed; and what is the status 
of the category. These two questions are connected. The relation between them has been 
changing as the discipline of taxonomy changes. Mayr (1969) offers a treatment of the 
history of taxonomy. He sees three main stages: 1) typology; 2) inductive empiricism; 
and 3) biological taxonomy
5. The stages are associated with such figures as, respectively, 
Aristotle and Linneaus; Lamarck and Cuvier; and Darwin
6. However, it would be 
incorrect to view these stages as a linear progression. Rather, there are loops and apparent 
backward and sideways movements; one such example is the development of numerical 
taxonomy, which postdates Darwin but often has more in common with inductive 
empiricism. Typological definitions of species are still used, often for convenience: 
elements of a priorism remain in modern taxonomy. Current practice seems to employ all 
three of the approaches. Goto (1982) discusses a range of different types of taxonomy 
which focus on different aspects of species
7. Further, descriptions of species tend to 
discuss various types of identifiers.  
                                                 
5 Goto (1982) defines three stages in modern taxonomy: alpha, grouping of things which appear similar; 
beta, the ordering of taxa; and gamma, examining origin, or in Simpson’s (1961) terms, contiguity. 
Appearance can refer to size, colour, bioluminescence, patterning, etc. In humans, phrenology and facial 
features were once used to determine race (Malik, 2008: 135, 228). However, ‘appearance’ here can mean a 
variety of things including behaviour, which itself contains a massive variety of criteria, such as sounds 
made, mating rituals, hibernation patterns, nest building, etc. 
6 Within these three stages, there are further variations, such as cladism.  
7 In addition, location of the creature aids its classification. Some creatures are categorised by examining 
their relations to other species. For example, some species may be identified by the presence of a parasite 
common to them. Related to that, immunotaxonomy attempts to categories on the basis of the antibodies 
present in animals (Goto, 1982: 25). Related to that, other taxonomic procedures examine the proteins 
present in creatures; and this is just one form of chemical taxonomy; which is itself one form of taxonomy 
which focuses on internal aspects of the creature being examined rather than external criteria. 
Cytotaxonomy is the classification according to cells, in terms of their structure, biochemistry, genes and 
other physiological data (Goto: 45). Chromosome numbers have a similar function. Each one of these 
distinctive set of criteria also have associated techniques. For example, one might use measurement 
techniques which break down the frequency of sounds made in the songs to find similarities across birds   10 
Under the typological approach, a sample of creatures is assessed. This led to the 
creation of types which described appearance, behaviour, habitat and the like. These 
types act as standards for identifying future creatures. Questions can be raised about the 
method of constructing the category; but for now we focus on the type of category 
created. One might call the category ‘classical’; an alternative nomenclature might be 
Aristotelian, or even Cartesian. A classical category had certain characteristics: each 
category is mutually exclusive and is ideally fixed. The category would be an element in 
an exhaustive classification system. The goal of this system (or at least its creator) is to 
accurately describe the world as it is. “A classification is a spatial, temporal, or spatio-
temporal segmentation of the world” (Bowker and Star, 1999: 10) and thus a good 
classification should segment the world accurately. Divisions in categories reflect 
divisions in reality. Divisions are often based on differences in essence. A good 
classification should have no normative or instrumental motivation or force. The 
segmentation does not displace the world, nor should it have any causal power. 
Categories reflect the world: a tiger is a tiger because of its capacities, not because it is 
classified as a tiger. Indeed, a key ontological assumption made in classification – 
essential for the operation to proceed – is that the object to be classified stays essentially 
the same during the process. Similarly, nomenclature should have no effect on the nature 
of the thing being named.  
Two factors in taxonomy led to the typological approach being displaced by 
others. First, biologists objected to the a priorism of the method and demanded that more 
empirical rigour be applied to classification. Second, the methods by which data were 
                                                 
(Goto: 34). This set of techniques points to a number of different ways in which HE could be defined; and 
by which heterodox economists could be identified.   11 
analysed changed. These methods shall be discussed further below. However, other 
elements of the classical category remain largely in tact. Although major revisions of taxa 
do occur (see for example, the work of the Angiosperm Phylogeny Group: see Palmer et 
al, 2004, and papers in that issue) they are quite rare. New species are found and others 
die out, but their classification remains, and retains a classical character.  
However, in human societies, classification systems rarely resemble closely this 
classical model (see Bowker and Star, 1999). Not only are the methods of collecting and 
analysing data more in line with numerical or biological taxonomy (stages 2 and 3 in 
Mayr’s schema), but additionally the resulting categories are of a different character. We 
might call them ‘modern’ categories in contrast with their classical predecessors. Modern 
categories are often fuzzy, in non-exhaustive (having large ‘other’ classes) classification 
systems, which are constructed for a particular purpose. This purpose may be 
empowerment, as in the case of the Nursing Interventions Classification, which 
highlighted the activities of nursing staff which had been neglected previously (Bowker 
and Star, ch. 7); or it may be largely oppressive, as in the case of race (see Bowker and 
Star, ch. 6; Malik, 2008). The categories are often highly flexible and changing. The 
quotation at the beginning of the paper, from a former South African interior minister, 
shows the farcically arbitrary nature of the apartheid system; which reflects the arbitrary 
nature of racial classification (Malik). Modern categories in everyday use are highly 
provisional, and reflect competing classification systems and associated interests. 
(Accordingly even the terms ‘classical’ and ‘modern’ here should be regarded as working 
prototype classes). It could be argued that the debate over the definition of HE is a 
competition between prototypical classes. Further it may be that some authors treat HE as   12 
a classical category when it ought to be treated as prototypical. However, both of those 
conjectures also depend on the nature of HE as an object.  
This brief discussion of a vast field is important for the treatment of HE in several 
ways: 1) the method of data collection is important; 2) the status of the category is 
important: the category may be more a) classical or b) ‘modern’; 3) there are two types of 
biological approach which could be applied to categories: a) one based on the essence of 
entities; and b) one based on identifying things to categorised from breeding populations; 
4) there is a vibrant mixed approach to classification even within zoology; 5) when 
applying categorisation to the socio-political and economic spheres, classical categories 
are less likely to be good descriptors; 6) in those spheres description may not be the goal. 
Additionally, the treatments of HE discussed above may beg more questions 
about HE than they answer. These include: what is the unit of analysis – and indeed what 
is the evidential base – of the treatments of HE? What logic of inference is being used by 
the commentators? What are the goals of the commentators? What is the role of historical 
and biological treatments of HE? What kind of object is HE? What kind of category is 
‘HE’? What is the relation between object and category? What is mainstream economics 
(and what is orthodox economics) and what is the relation (what is the nature of the 
distinction) between HE and it? The remainder of the paper investigates these questions.  
 
Evidential bases and inference 
 
It is worth revisiting Bowker and Star’s claim, quoted above, that it is human to classify 
and all human societies have engaged in classification. That is in fact a two-fold claim:   13 
one about the nature of humans and the other about human societies. On the one hand, 
they make a claim about the essence of humans (we tend to classify). If that claim were 
true, it would be surprising if the second claim were not true. Also, though, we can view 
the claims in a different causal order and as an inductive inference: Bowker and Star 
could observe a number of human civilisations and note that all have classification 
systems, leading them to regard the tendency to classify as essential to humans. There are 
several issues here: one is whether investigators identify an essence of the object of 
study. Lawson (2006, 2009) explicitly claims that a non-insistence on mathematical 
modelling is the nominal essence of HE, and that this reflects its real essence, i.e., a 
specific social ontology. However, setting that aside, whatever is the nature of the claim 
about the object, a second issue is how to reach that conclusion. Several authors argue for 
a definition of HE based on factors or characteristics common to or shared by a sample of 
subjects (Lavoie, 2006b; Lawson, 2006, 2009; Backhouse, 2000; Dequech, 2007). 
However, the unit of analysis chosen by these authors is often different: sometimes the 
unit is individual economists (Mearman, 2009) or specific exemplars (Lavoie, 2006b
8); 
more often, the unit of analysis is pre-existing schools (Lawson; Dequech, 2007; 
Backhouse, 2000) or research approaches (Davis, 2009). In other cases, though it is clear 
a survey is being done, the evidence base is not explicit (Colander, 2009; Lee, 2010a
9; 
Wrenn, 2007
10; Backhouse, 2004; Dow, 2000). 
However, one feature common to the zoologist and the commentator on HE is the 
need to decide where to begin looking. Why study creature A rather than creature Z? 
                                                 
8 Lavoie explicitly criticises Davidson’s (2003-4) evidential base as too narrow. 
9 It should be acknowledged that Lee (book) does offer a comprehensive discussion of evidence available 
for the assessment of heterodox economics.  
10 Note: although it is clear what Wrenn’s own evidence base is (historians of economic thought) it is not 
clear what evidence base those subjects use.   14 
Why study J.M. Keynes and not R.E. Lucas? Commentators on HE have tended to look 
in two main areas: a) literature which explicitly calls itself HE (Colander, et al, 2004; 
Lawson, 2009); and b) literature in areas traditionally regarded as HE (Backhouse, 2000, 
2004; Dow, 2000; Lavoie, 2006b). The second area is somewhat questionable because it 
implicitly derives a definition of HE from pre-existing schools and makes implicit 
assumptions about connections and similarity between them. The former is marginally 
preferable, therefore; but not free from the criticism of circularity. For an individual to 
identify him/herself as heterodox presupposes a definition of HE; given the myriad 
available definitions, it is entirely possible that two self-identified heterodox economists 
could hold very different understandings of what HE is. An assumption must be made 
that there is some shared, common sense understanding of what HE is. So, even using 
self-identification as a criterion for being heterodox does not illuminate much what HE is.  
In modern taxonomy, species are defined (roughly) via breeding populations: if 
creature A can mate successfully (not including non-reproducible hybrid creatures) with 
creature B, they can be said to be part of specie x. Specie x is then defined in terms of a 
range of its characteristics. Creature C may then be identified as also a member of x. One 
of the drivers of this investigation has been to try to apply methods of taxonomy to HE. 
Clearly, there are barriers to such an attempt. It is not trivial to make an analogy from 
contiguity to economists here; however, in some senses it is possible to apply these 
principles to examining populations of economists. Some of their phenotypic 
(appearance) criteria might be the holding of particular theoretical positions, or working 
with a particular method. Clearly, groups of economists exchange ideas, and as such, 
could be said to be reproducing. Individual case studies of economists can be used to   15 
examine their ‘origins’ either in terms of PhD supervision or other study, or simply by 
studying their citations
11. Mearman (2009) adopts a numerical taxonomy approach in 
defining HE as a population of individuals, specifically the membership of the AHE. 
However, this approach was also limited because it took HE to be exhausted by ideas 
held by economists and ignored other factors, such as institutional structures and other 
sources of power. However, by, for example, defining a journal X as heterodox and a 
journal Y as mainstream, the commentator once again introduces a typological definition 
of HE, which we are seeking to avoid. 
In summary, establishing the evidential base for making claims about HE is 
important but often neglected. However, those claims raise questions of other types, for 
instance about the nature of HE and about the logic of inference used. Several authors 
look for common elements across their data sets. These articles use elements of analytic 
induction to arrive at conclusions about the nature of HE. These inductions are usually 
done via verbal methods of analysis, although Mearman (2009) uses statistical techniques 
such as cluster and factor analysis.  
Many of these treatments night be said to be working at the surface. However, is 
there something deeper at work here? Almost all authors avoid explicit statements about 
the ontological status of their claims. Lawson (2006, 2009) is unique in discussing HE in 
terms of essence. For Lawson, as stated, HE has a nominal essence (way of identifying it) 
and a real essence (which drives the nominal essence). Lawson’s approach has an explicit 
ontology of depth realism underlying it. Colander et al (2004) talk in terms of HE as a 
complex system. Dow (2000) has an underlying ontology of schools of thought as 
                                                 
11 As Malik (2008) argues, culture has replaced genetics as a determinant of individual categorisation; this 
may be assessed via anthropological techniques.   16 
structured, distinct and open. Davis (2009) is clearly committed to an ontology of agents 
embedded in social structures. Other treatments of HE which tend not to state their 
ontology all involve one, which is evident in what they consider useful in identifying and 
defining HE. The fact that many discuss HE in terms of groups or schools suggests that 
they consider groups ontologically important. The role of journals and citation in defining 
HE is evidence that it is understood as irreducible to individuals.  
Despite these implicit ontologies, it is not always clear what logical move authors 
on HE make, because it is not clear what they aim to achieve when drawing conclusions. 
Specifically, it is not entirely clear what type of factors might be common and what status 
they have. Is HE defined in terms of an essence (nominal or real), a causal factor, a 
common heritage or descent, or mere family resemblance, a la Wittgenstein? For the 
majority of the authors surveyed, the answer to this question is not clear. Yet, the nature 
of the factor that defines HE also affects the logic of inference being used. For surface 
similarities, the use of a simple induction might suffice (notwithstanding the problem of 
induction). At this point, it might be objected that the definitions of HE offered are far 
from surface phenomena in that they drive many higher level concepts and behaviours: 
for example, a belief in open systems (Dow, 2000) strongly affects the status of theories, 
empirical methods used, and the types of agents portrayed in theories. It might then be 
argued that by moving below the surface, these authors have engaged in a different type 
of logic. However, as discussed below, it might equally be the case that the authors have 
simply chosen a level of abstraction at which a simple definition of HE – and a strict 
distinction between it and the mainstream – can be achieved. Further, if these authors are 
engaged in a logic of, say, moving from specific events to the structures and mechanisms   17 
which caused them (retroduction), it is difficult to find this explicit claim. Even Lawson – 
who might be expected to explicitly discuss his logic as retroductive – does not do so, 
and instead appears to be finding common characteristics or features.  
This section has argued that existing treatments of HE do not always clearly state 
their evidential base, or unit of analysis, or the logic of inference being used, or the status 
of the definition being proposed. It is held that future treatments of HE ought to be 
clearer on these points. Thus, and further, it is possible to conclude that while biological 
treatments of HE may provide some insight into its nature (alongside intellectual and 
sociological treatments), so far this has been only limitedly the case. One might argue 
that the techniques of numerical taxonomy have been employed; but then again these are 
mainly the techniques of statistical induction. While some historical treatments of HE 
exist (for example, Lee, 2010b; Davis, 2009; Backhouse, 2000; King, 2002) there is only 
a limited sense in which the biological concept of descent is evident in them. Further, 
while some work (Lee, 2010b; Mearman, 2009) does investigate populations of breeding 
economists, most do not. In defence of these existing treatments, though, the mixed 
approach to defining HE adopted by many authors does reflect the current state in 
zoology
12. The issue of simple definitions will be returned to. However, first a discussion 
of the likely nature of HE needs to be developed further.  
 
                                                 
12 An exhibit at the Leiden University ‘systematic garden’ emphasises this point. “What do a rose and a 
stinging nettle have in common? Difficult to see with the naked eye! Visible similarities are the toothed leaf 
margins and the inflorescences, in which flowers are arranged in cymes. Anthers are arranged in more than 
two whorls, which are usually not joined to the petals. Petals are often arranged on the rim of a cup-shaped 
receptacle (hypanthium), but in many families the flowers are too small to observe this…The present 
composition of the order Rosales…is based on: molecular characters [such as characteristics of the plant 
DNA]…the presence of nitrogen fixing bacteria of the genus Frankia…the presence of 
dihydroflavonols…the presence of prismatic crystals in some cells…the presence of mucilage cells” (italics 
in original). Thus the order of Rosales is classified in terms of genetic structure, but also appearance. 
(Source: author photograph of exhibit – need permission?)   18 
What type of object is Heterodox Economics? 
 
Any definition of HE inevitably reflects epistemological and ontological beliefs
13 held by 
the investigator. Whatever data are used, they are interpreted through those beliefs. Given 
Lawson’s (2006, 2009) claim that heterodox economists hold a particular social ontology 
in common; given Dow’s (2000) claims that heterodox economics holds that the world 
comprises open systems; and given that most of the authors (and the vast majority in this 
sample) who comment on HE would describe themselves as heterodox or at least 
sympathetic to it (Backhouse and Colander), then it would be surprising if those authors 
did not hold a similar ontology; and it would be even more surprising if they did not 
conceive HE as reflecting that ontology. 
Potts (2000) defines heterodox economics as holding a particular ontology, more 
akin to complex adaptive systems than the unified field theory he says is held by 
mainstream economists. Several commentators explicitly describe HE as a complex 
system (Colander, 2009; Colander et al 2004; Davis, 2009) or use language which 
suggests that is a complex object. Colander et al argue that there is no single unifying 
element to HE; Colander is however prepared to claim that both HE and mainstream 
economics are defined in terms of attitude to method. For Lawson (2006, 2009), although 
he identifies HE as holding a specific ontology leading to a non-insistence on 
mathematical modelling, he recognises the multi-faceted nature of HE. For Lawson, HE 
comprises schools with different theoretical positions and different foci. For Lee (2010a), 
HE is a “concatenation” (8), again suggesting a complex object. Wrenn (2004) also 
                                                 
13 The use of the word ‘beliefs’ here should not be interpreted too strongly. ‘Theory’ could instead be used 
quite effectively. However, ‘belief’ communicates that often, ontological commitment is made: the author 
holds that the world is a particular way – provisionally, but often strongly.   19 
provides support for the notion of HE as a complex, multi-faceted object, comprising 
theories, individuals, and groups. As discussed above, several authors see HE as a 
grouping of schools of thought. For Dequech (2007: 280), HE is at “a higher degree of 
generality” than these schools. Backhouse (2004) adds another layer of complexity, 
describing individuals within economics who are themselves multi-faceted. This view 
accords with the theory of agents as purposive and having real choice propagated by 
many heterodox authors. One of these, Davis (2009) adds another dimension to HE by 
identifying multiple strands of its definition, and adding in dynamics to classify different 
approaches in economics. He argues that all approaches have an origin story and an 
orientation. For Davis, HE may be an individual or group which has become excluded or 
never had access to the mainstream, and has a generally outward orientation. However, 
he notes that some heterodox economists are inwardly orientated. A reasonable 
conclusion based on these treatments is that HE is a multi-faceted object.  
One aspect of being a complex system is that the object is a set of elements with 
connections between them (see Potts, 2000). In some cases, the connections are strong, in 
others less so. For example, in terms of the relations purported by Lawson (2006, 2009), 
the bonds between the different (ostensibly) heterodox elements are strong
14. However, in 
terms of other relations, the connections are much weaker. For example, there is little in 
common politically between Austrians and Marxists. Indeed, in terms of politics there is 
much more in common between Austrians and some mainstreamers. Further, if we 
claimed that ‘the mainstream’ holds a belief that most of the time, the social provisioning 
problem can be best solved by markets with a little government assistance (cf. Lavoie, 
                                                 
14 However, Davis (2009) objects, claiming that, for example, neo-Ricardian economists do not employ 
Lawson’s ontology or his position on methods.   20 
2006a), a commonality of approach could be found between the mainstream and many 
Keynesians. We could carry on with this analysis: it would show that each of the simple 
definitions of HE offered creates exceptions, or people who do not fall easily into either 
HE or the mainstream. Further, Mearman (2009) shows that the strength with which self-
identified heterodox economists hold core beliefs about economics (such as the 
importance of power in studying the economy) varies considerably; as does the extent to 
which they consider themselves heterodox, and mainstream. Mearman shows also that 
core members of the group have strong agreement on many issues, but more peripheral 
members have fewer strong agreements and fewer agreements of all kinds with either the 
core or each other. Lee’s (2010b) extensive investigation of heterodox communities 
shows further that connections between ‘heterodox’ groups and ‘heterodox’ individuals, 
measured via memberships of groups, subscriptions to journals, citations of work, and the 
like, are very complex.  
In summary, a cursory sketch of HE as an object would need to include a range of 
facets and elements. HE might be thought of as a complex system involving a vast array 
of elements and connections of varying strengths between them. The elements involve 
individual agential economists and their ideas. Those ideas reside at various layers, such 
as theories, policies, ontologies, epistemologies, methods, methodologies. Other elements 
present – some of which are sources of connections between them – would be publication 
and research outlets, such as journals and conferences. Many of these in turn are 
organised by associations of economists. These associations are a subset of other social 
relations, which are in turn related to policy makers, funders, corporations and other 
actors with power. Included in these power brokers are mainstream economists. Given   21 
the common definition of HE as oppositional to mainstream economics, it is clear that 
mainstream economists and economics form part – if only a peripheral one – of the HE 
system. HE would display properties of an open system, and depth; as such, any 
individual heterodox idea or heterodox economist would be multiply and contingently 
caused. Another relevant causal factor – reflecting particularly the taxonomic concern 
with lineage – is the descent from one economist to another, for example via PhD 
supervision; similarly the history of economic ideas would be causal. Reflecting the 
importance of history, HE would be a dynamic, changing object. 
 
What type of category is ‘Heterodox Economics’? 
 
Given these complex descriptions of HE as a complex object (if not explicitly a complex 
system), and given that authors are explicit about this, what might we expect about ‘HE’ 
as a category? We might expect it to resemble much more a ‘modern’ category. However, 
this is often not the case. Many of the definitions treat HE as a classical category.  
First, though, we should address an assumption which has been smuggled in: that 
there ought to be some correspondence between category and object. That may of course 
appear controversial given the welter of literature on the realisticness of models and 
assumptions, abstraction, instrumentalism and further related issues. However, two 
strands of literature seem to justify the use of the assumption. The first is that in what is 
regarded as heterodox economics, realisticness is generally regarded as desirable. Many 
of the authors surveyed here have explicitly argued for realism in economics (Lawson, 
1997, 2003 is an obvious example). Such realist approaches argue that theories ought to   22 
be based in reality
15. Second, many of those authors have explicitly stated or strongly 
implied that the goal of their survey is to provide a description of heterodox economics. 
This seems most strongly the case in Colander et al (2004), Wrenn (2007), Dequech 
(2007), Backhouse (2004) and Davis (2009), who comments that the “reference of the 
term ‘heterodox economics’ is quite different from what most economists, heterodox and 
orthodox, believe it to be” (83). Backhouse’s aim is to “classify current schools of 
thought in an intuitively acceptable way” (2000: 149). We may ascribe the goal of 
explanation to Lawson (2006, 2009) and Davis (2009). That these are the apparent goals 
should not surprise anyone – at least anyone familiar with the common conception of 




To what extent do treatments try to create exhaustive classification? Some treatments 
explicitly avoid doing so. For example Lee (2010a) states explicitly that mainstream and 
heterodox economics are not the only existing approaches (he cites Islamic Economics as 
an approach which is neither mainstream nor heterodox). In other work, implicitly 
exhaustive categories are produced. Colander (2009), Lavoie (2006b) and Lawson (2009) 
seem to employ exhaustive classification. The fact that Colander discusses heterodoxy 
within the mainstream still results in exhaustive categories. Even Dow (2000), who had 
previously written of the perils of dualism (1990), can be read as employing only the two 
                                                 
15 One possible objection to our argument should be noted: that complex objects can have simple 
descriptions. For instance, a tiger can be described as panthera tigris quite easily. However, of course that 
name, or indeed ‘tiger’, is merely a name. As made clear above (fn. 10) modern descriptions of species 
have multiple aspects. Further, these descriptions have as their basis, specific genetic data, in addition to 
data on appearance, behaviour, etc.   23 
categories mainstream and heterodox. Indeed, even where a commentator discusses 
variety within either heterodox or mainstream, or even overlaps between heterodox and 
mainstream, if they define heterodox as non-mainstream, often they result in a 
classification system exhausted by those two categories. Given that this aspect applies to 
most of the commentators discussed here (discussed below) we can ascribe most of them 
with exhaustiveness. Backhouse’s (2000, 2004) treatments may also be regarded as 
exhaustive, albeit perhaps with more categories. His classification system could be read 
as exhausted, by orthodox economists and dissenters, with heterodox included with 
dissenters; or as orthodox, dissenters, heterodox; or as orthodox, dissenters, heterodox 
plus non-economists (2004: 269). In Backhouse’s case, the categories appear to exist on a 
continuum.  
 
As Dow (1990) has argued, exhaustive classification systems may be regarded as 
problematic because the grounds for making such a claim may be weak. Having said that, 
practically, as Bowker and Star (1999) suggest, in their discussion of the International 
Classification of Diseases, classification systems tend to aim to be exhaustive. This may 
be through the use of an ‘other’ category; however, if that category becomes too large, 
the system may collapse. In economics, for instance, if there were held to be two main 
market structures, perfect competition and monopoly, plus ‘others’, as it became apparent 
that the other market structures dominate in reality, more theorisation of them would be   24 
demanded
16. At this stage, though, the main point about classifications involving HE is 




To what extent do the treatments of HE create fixed categories? Again, this varies across 
the sample of commentators, to a greater degree than was the case with exhaustiveness. 
Several authors explicitly wish to avoid a fixed definition. Lawson (2006: 483-4) states 
that he does not want to reify the category of HE. Wrenn’s (2007) interviewees were 
clear that HE changes. Davis (2009) criticises existing treatments of HE as being fixed, 
and as attacking a concept of the mainstream which is significantly out of date (c. 1980 in 
his estimate). Therefore, he builds origin and orientation of economists into his definition 
of HE, which suggests fluidity in the category. Backhouse (2004) anticipates Davis’ 
concern, claiming that many definitions of HE “simplify away the dynamics of the 
profession” (268). Lavoie (2006b) claims that heterodox differs in different spheres. 
Dequech (2007) is careful to define HE ‘in the current period’ and complains that 
definitions of HE are not careful enough to state to which period they refer (280). 
Interestingly, Dequech’s complaint is that definitions of HE that focus on theoretical 
content or other intellectual criteria are often incorrect because of the fluidity of the 
concepts found therein. Thus, one reason he favours sociological definitions of HE is that 
they are valid for longer. He seems, therefore, almost to advocate a fixed definition, or at 
least one that endures. Perhaps ironically, the analytical definition of HE as non-
                                                 
16 It is interesting to note that the JEL classification scheme is dominated by mainstream concerns. There is 
very fine granulation of categories for some topics, for instance category C, mathematical and quantitative 
methods; yet the granulation of B5, current heterodox approaches, is much lower.    25 
mainstream would achieve this endurance. Meador (2009) embraces this longevity by 
suggesting that HE has had an extensive period of coherence; that is because he defines 
HE as non-mainstream, and defines the mainstream in terms of logical positivism, and 
thence traces it back to the Vienna Circle.  
Fixed categories can be problematic for a number of reasons. They run the risk of 
losing engagement with a changing reality, and thereby becoming useless. As Bowker 
and Star (1999, ch. 6) report, the apartheid system was full of absurdities, for example of 
people changing their designated colour (reinforcing the absence of any real basis for 
race: Malik, 2008), another reason it lost credibility. Further, given the difficulties of 
arriving at firm definitions of objects, authors such as Dow (1990) argue that they should 
always be provisional. Several commentators discussed here try to avoid fixity because 
they explicitly recognise some of its problems. One such problem is via labelling. 
Heterodox economists, labelled or self-labelled as such, may start to act in particular 
ways, or only take designated heterodox concepts or methods seriously. Alternatively 
they might suffer from confirmation bias or group polarisation (see, for example, Myers 
and Lamm, 1976). Thus, future re-examinations of HE would more likely arrive at the 
same key concepts as defining HE. Some of the definitions of HE offered may be so strict 
that they generate this labelling effect. Thus, despite not wishing to reify the category, 
Lawson’s (2006, 2009) strong definition of HE may change behaviour of some 
economists, for instance by eschewing statistical techniques – as their interpretation of 
Lawson rather than his recommendation – reinforcing the definition of HE he offers. 
Indeed, the power of Lawson’s critique may have already had that effect on the practice 
of heterodox economists.    26 
In summary, then, though many commentators on HE explicitly wish to avoid 
fixity, the strength of their definition may render HE effectively fixed for a long period. 
Sociological definitions of HE may be particularly problematic in this regard. In this way, 
HE again reflects a classical category. However, there seem good reasons to avoid fixed 
definitions of HE. One reason is the large number of competing definitions. As discussed 
below, many of the commentators accept that HE is a complex object and discuss various 
aspects of it; however when they come to define HE they arrive at a single criterion. 
Taken together these offer a multi-dimensional definition of HE. Taken as individual 
definitions they suggest a competition. That in turn suggests that HE ought to have the 




One of the main ways HE seems to resemble a classical category is that often, strict 
distinctions are made between it and other approaches. As discussed above, mutual 
exclusivity can be traced back to exhaustiveness: if HE is non-mainstream, this creates 
exhaustive and strictly distinct categories. Given that many of the definitions of HE have 
it being non-mainstream as a starting point, strict distinctions are immediately apparent. 
Beyond that, more specific definitions attempt to find a single criterion which strictly 
distinguishes mainstream (or orthodox, in some cases) from heterodox. Sociological 
definitions focus on the location of power. Mainstream economists have the power and 
heterodox economists do not. However, as Colander et al (2004) point out, there are 
degrees to which different groups in the mainstream have power. They argue that there is   27 
an elite in the mainstream which really holds the power to determine the direction of the 
profession. The remainder of the mainstream follows this agenda. Some of these people 
have ideas which could be regarded as heterodox. Sargent, for example, who once 
propagated rational expectations theory, has change tack towards complexity. Arrow has 
made a similar turn. Backhouse (2004: 267) identifies Stiglitz as using formal tools to 
make anti-market arguments.  
In terms of intellectual definitions of HE, some authors claim a strict distinction 
between it and the mainstream. Meador (2009), Lee (2010a) and Lawson (2006, 2009) 
seem most clearly to be pursuing a strict distinction. For Meador, HE and mainstream 
have completely different epistemes. Lee (2010) describes them as “completely different” 
(page) and indeed as non-comparable (passim). Dow (2000) uses a strict distinction for 
analytical convenience. Davis (2009) suggests a core-periphery distinction between them. 
On the other hand, Colander (2009) argues for a heterodoxy within the mainstream. For 
Lavoie (2006b) the difference between economists or groups of them is defined in terms 
of strength of connection, which can vary between substantive concerns. Wrenn’s (2007) 
interviewees agreed little about which schools to label as HE and identified several 
‘boundary objects’ or bridging groups which straddled any divide. Backhouse’s (2000, 
2004) analysis suggests that the distinction between HE and mainstream is much fuzzier 
than in some of the other treatments discussed here. Similarly, Davis (2009) offers a set 
of criteria for heterodoxy which can be partially met by individuals, ideas or groups.  
Dow’s (1990) arguments against strictly separable groups apply: the world may 
have an underlying unity, or be too complex, to be adequately described in terms of 
scientific categories. Further, limits to human knowledge and differences in epistemology   28 
may also render categories inaccurate or inappropriate in other ways. Given the concrete 
experience of economists, strict distinction may also be impossible. If, for instance, the 
mainstream is defined in terms of what is published in the American Economic Review, it 
is confined to a very narrow range of individuals indeed. An individual economist could 
be doing work on similar topics, using similar methods, with similar theoretical and other 
principles  underlying  it,  but  still  not  be  a  ‘proper’  mainstream  economist.  Such 
individuals would have fuzzy membership of both mainstream and heterodox sets, with 
their membership score higher for mainstream. Such a formulation is arguably superior to 
one in crisp sets because it allows overlap and allows some commonality between groups 
of economists to be recognised. One flaw with treatments like Lee’s (2010a) is that they 
ignore common aspects between economists. It is obvious that economists are studying 
something similar, albeit from different starting points.  
Blurred boundaries are inevitable in real world situations, but create problems for 
categorisation. However, there is growing recognition that blurred boundaries can be 
incorporated into systematic thinking. One way in which this can be done is via fuzzy 
sets. Whilst in a crisp set, individuals have either [0,1] membership, in fuzzy sets 
individuals can have variable membership. So, an economist can be heterodox in many 
ways – and therefore clearly a member of that set – but also a member of another (say, 
the mainstream) set. Mearman (2009) asked self-identified heterodox economists to what 
extent they would agree with a statement that they are heterodox. On average, they 
responded that they agreed about 85%. However, they also agreed about 20% that they 
were mainstream (they also agreed about 80% that they were pluralist).    29 
However, both crisp and fuzzy sets suffer from the same problem: they rely on 
single definitions of the set. Also, they are generally flat. As was discussed earlier, HE is 
an object which may be best characterised as complex, perhaps with depth. So, as a 
starting point, a set-based conception of HE is problematic. While Dequech (2007) is the 
only author surveyed here who talks explicitly in terms of sets, many of the others can be 
interpreted as doing so. Thus, as descriptions of the object, the category appears 
fundamentally flawed. Further, it should not be forgotten that if heterodox is defined as 
non-mainstream, it is internally related with the mainstream and therefore cannot be 
treated as entirely separate. So, we face a paradox: many of the authors surveyed here 
propose HE as a complex, multi-faceted object, but many (and in many cases the same) 
authors define HE as a category with a single, simple definition, and as strictly distinct 
from the mainstream.  
These strict distinctions occur because the authors choose a level of abstraction 
which creates them. In taxonomy, a distinction is often made between ‘lumpers’ who like 
to group objects together, and ‘splitters’ who like to separate objects. Lumpers will 
generally create fewer categories while splitters will create more categories. Lumping can 
be advantageous because it creates simple, easy to communicate systems (which as such 
are likely to survive); but lumping can also create categories which quickly appear 
insufficiently finely grained and annoy their members and users. In some respects, our 
sample of authors are lumpers, in that they generally arrive at two categories; but viewed 
differently they are splitters, focusing on differences between economists (or groups of) 
rather than commonality.    30 
Lumping or splitting are tendencies in thought, which could be motivated by a 
number of factors, for example that fewer categories generally work better, or that more 
categories capture reality better. The question is: what motivates the authors sampled to 
reach their strict distinctions? A classical or scientific category should be driven by the 
desire to describe reality well. All of the authors state that they wish to provide good 
descriptions; they often imply that by criticising other descriptions as inadequate (see for 
instance, Davis’ (2009) comment on Lawson’s (2006) description, and Lawson’s (2009) 
comment on Davis’ description in reply). Explanation is another motive, and it can be 
seen in many of the treatments discussed.  
 
Non-normative and non-instrumental  
 
However, other motives are possible (albeit very difficult to identify). Indeed, that is one 
of the differences between a modern category and a classical one. One of these motives 
might be rhetorical, i.e. as being able to persuade others of one’s view. As Bowker and 
Star (1999) and Malik (2008) note, classifications are often driven by the needs of the 
designer, for example to label, control or suppress a target group; or by the needs of the 
user, for example for ease of data entry or implementation. Another motive might be to 
advocate for a particular group. It is interesting that the category ‘HE’ has been created 
by heterodox economists, not by mainstream economists trying to marginalise them. As a 
counterpoint to the lack of power held by heterodox groups, they have acted to mobilise 
jointly. However, for this to happen, some rallying point for HE must be identified. That 
this is a goal of many authors is clear. Lee (2010a) attempts to argue for a completely   31 
separate heterodoxy which can exist with almost no reference to orthodoxy. Colander 
(2009) explicitly wants to work in the opposite direction but agrees with Lee that a more 
tolerant environment is necessary. Dow (2000) examines a strategic discussion of the 
possibility of progress for HE. In that, she foreshadows several treatments on strategic 
pluralism, which also argue against strict distinctions between HE and the mainstream 
(Davis, 2006; Sent, 2003; Garnett, 2005).  
So, while authors aim for descriptions of HE (and often the mainstream) which 
aim to capture its essential features, their choices of levels of abstraction which create 
strict distinctions raise questions about other motives they may have. In some cases, they 
hope to affect the reality they are describing. That then raises questions about the 
relationship between HE the object and HE the category. It appears that the category may 
affect the object as well as reverse. In the case of HE, a category of HE may lead to 
changed perception by economists (or groups of) about their own identities. This in turn 
may lead to changes in practice. A unified category of HE may create a unified group of 
heterodox economists, who adapt each others’ practices and cross-fertilise ideas. On the 
other hand, the act of self-identification can involve risk, as those with power may now 
choose to exercise it against those who stand out. Such considerations are at the heart of 
the debates about strategic pluralism.  
Here, though, our interest is on the relationship between category and object. It 
might be argued that having a category affect the object it is trying to define is non-
realist, whereas the authors surveyed are realist in the simple sense of holding that reality 
exists separate from descriptions of it. However, the identification stage and the influence   32 
stage can be regarded as sufficiently separate so that category and object are not 
conflated. There is a dialectic between the two but not an identity. 
As a summary, we can say that even though authors recognise that HE is a 
complex object, it is often described via a classical category. That this occurs suggests 
that HE the category may have some additional normative or instrumental role, which is 
one of the hallmarks of what we are calling a ‘modern’ category.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper employs a form of meta-analysis of a sample of existing contributions about 
heterodox economics. Discussion of those contributions is augmented by other evidence, 
some of which is interdisciplinary. The paper is also predicated on a social ontology 
which implies that individual economists’ positions are complex, over-determined, 
caused by deep mechanisms and are reinforced and changed by social structures, which 
are themselves changed and reinforced by individual agency. 
Definitions of HE tend to contain elements of sociological reasoning (based on 
power relations) and intellectual reasoning (based on key ideas). In both cases, a starting 
point is to assume that HE is non-mainstream economics. However, the literature 
suggests that HE is more than merely non-mainstream economics. In sociological terms 
this surplus element is evident in the formation of associations and other networks; in 
intellectual terms, the surplus appears methodological (defined widely). Another central 
element of HE is that its members self-identify as heterodox.    33 
On the face of it, sociological explanations of HE are also quite convincing. HE 
reflects power relations within the Economics discipline. Further, an appreciation of 
power is apparent in the actions of self-identified heterodox economists. The different 
intellectual definitions of HE all offer partial insight. However, while biological 
treatments of HE may provide some insight into its nature (alongside intellectual and 
sociological treatments), so far this has been only limitedly the case. Additionally the 
evidential base, unit of analysis and logic of inference for making claims about HE are 
often neglected. Several authors look for common elements across their data sets. They 
use elements of analytic induction to arrive at conclusions about the nature of HE. It is 
held that future treatments of HE ought to be clearer on these points. In their defence, the 
mixed approach to defining HE adopted by many authors does reflect the current state in 
zoology. 
Almost all authors avoid explicit statements about the ontological status of their 
claims. However, it seems reasonable to portray HE as a complex object (if not explicitly 
a complex system). Given these complex descriptions of HE, and given that authors are 
explicit about this, what might we expect about ‘HE’ as a category? The paper compared 
HE the object with types of category, provisionally called ‘classical’ and ‘modern’. We 
might expect HE to resemble much more a ‘modern’ category. However, this is often not 
the case. Many of the definitions treat HE as a classical category. Classifications 
involving HE are mostly exhaustive. Though many commentators on HE explicitly wish 
to avoid fixity, the strength of their definition may render HE effectively fixed for a long 
period. Sociological definitions of HE may be particularly problematic in this regard. The 
multi-dimensional definition of HE suggests a set of individual definitions in   34 
competition. That in turn suggests that HE ought to have the status of a prototypical 
category, and not be fixed.  
Many of the treatments of HE ignore common aspects between economists and 
split HE strictly from the mainstream. These strict distinctions occur because the authors 
choose a level of abstraction which creates them. So, while authors aim for descriptions 
of HE (and often the mainstream) which aim to capture its essential features, their 
choices of levels of abstraction which create strict distinctions raise questions about other 
motives they may have. In some cases, they hope to affect the reality they are describing. 
That this occurs suggests that HE the category may have some additional normative or 
instrumental role, which is another hallmark of what we are calling a ‘modern’ category. 
What are the implications of these findings? First, it would seem that arguments 
based on a strong definition of HE may be extremely problematic. Strategically, 
communication between heterodox and mainstream economists may be more possible 
than some think. Second, given the implicit ontologies held by the commentators, the use 
of a classical category suggests an inconsistency between theory and practice. Third, 
biological treatments of HE based on breeding populations and descent may be 
profitable, although they are unlikely to answer the question of what HE is: however they 
might be a partial solution.  
The most fundamental question is whether HE should be abandoned as a 
category. A strong argument would be that unless it better represents its object and 
therefore the current reality in Economics, it should be at least sidelined. Further it could 
be argued that until there is a clear understanding of what HE is, it should not be used. An   35 
even stricter position is that HE should be abandoned completely because there is no such 
object as HE, or at least not one which can be identified.  
In short, these arguments can be addressed thus: first, it must be admitted that all 
categories involve rough simplifications of complex objects and that this does not make 
them useless. There can be general agreement that a category does not quite capture the 
object it represents, but that it does so adequately enough. The question, then, becomes 
whether the object is doing its job(s) of providing a description, gathering people around 
it, being communicable to others, and so on. Personal experience suggests that self-
identified heterodox economists feel reasonably comfortable with the term, although 
some object that is unnecessarily divisive. Second, there is clearly not agreement on what 
HE means, but this is not necessarily a problem. The same term can be expected to mean 
different things in different language games. The question then becomes whether the term 
helps in playing the game, and the game of games. It is too early to say whether HE is 
successful in this regard
17. Third, it seems reasonable as a provisional position to claim 
that there are areas which are outside the mainstream. Though to lump all these together 
would seem arbitrary, it is also evident that there is clear development of social structure 
between these groups, allowing us to claim that there is something which coheres enough 
to be provisionally given a collective title. The problem appears to arise when that object 
is treated as utterly separate from the rest.  
 
                                                 
17 Arguably what might make HE more persuasive is that in this regard HE sits in a long tradition in 
economics, of categories which are purposefully somewhat vague and flexible abstractions. Loasby (2003) 
ascribes such categories to Adam Smith; Davis (1999) does likewise for Keynes.    36 
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